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ABSTRACT
The argument diagramming method developed by Monroe C. Beardsley in his (1950) book 
Practical Logic, which has since become the gold standard for diagramming arguments in 
informal logic, makes it possible to map the relation between premises and conclusions of 
a chain of reasoning in relatively complex ways. The method has since been adapted and 
developed in a number of directions by contemporary informal logicians and argumenta-
tion theorists. It has proved useful in practical applications and especially pedagogically in 
teaching basic logic and critical reasoning skills at all levels of scientific education. I pro-
pose in this essay to build on Beardsley diagramming techniques to refine and supplement 
their  structural  tools  for  visualizing  logical  relationships  in  a  number  of  categories  not 
originally accommodated by the method, including dilemma and other disjunctive and 
conditional inferences, reductio  ad  absurdum arguments, efforts to contradict arguments, 
and logically circular reasoning, with sugestions for improved diagramming of logical struc-
tures.
1. DIAGRAMMING ARGUMENTS
As  a  tool  in  understanding  and  evaluating  arguments,  diagramming 
techniques offer a useful and elegant representation of inferential struc-
ture.  Diagramming  the  informal  interrelations  between  an  argument’s 
assumptions and conclusions helps us to appreciate the logic of its im-
plicational connections, and to identify its strengths and weaknesses1.
For simplicity, and because the needed examples tend to be more uni-
vocal in informal logical structure, we confine attention exclusively to de-
1  The standard diagramming method was originally proposed by Beardsley (1950), and 
further refined by Thomas (1973) and Scriven (1976).
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ductive  inferences.  Modifications  for  inductive  and  other  kinds  of  argu-
ment diagramming are intuitive and straightforwardly modeled structural-
ly on corresponding deductive paradigms, and logically valid ones at that. 
There is accordingly scant motivation, especially in the first instance when 
the basic enhancements of standard argument diagramming are being pre-
sented and proposed, for going beyond deductive inference as the simplest 
and the most important to make sure at the outset of getting right. What 
kind of argument diagramming could we reasonably be said to have, if we 
cannot even explain how to diagram the inferential structures of deductive-
ly valid arguments? We have to start somewhere, and we choose for good 
reasons to start with deductive validity among the kinds of arguments that 
informal logic is most often expected to analyze2.
2. STANDARD DIAGRAMMING IN THE SIMPLEST CASE 
The first step in the standard method of diagramming in informal logic 
is to number an argument’s assumptions and conclusions, typically dis-
tinguished in their ordinary language expressions by inference indicator 
terms, like ‘thus’, ‘therefore’, ‘hence’. In the simplest case, where a sin-
gle conclusion is supposed to follow from a single assumption, the as-
sumption and conclusion numbers are written out horizontally with the 
conclusion below the assumption, connected by a vertical arrow running 
from assumption to conclusion. Here is an argument with this straight-
forward structure.
1. Today is Tuesday.
—————————
2. Tomorrow will be Wednesday.
The  argument  can  be  represented  by  the  following  most  basic  dia-
gram:
(1)
 ↓
(2)
2  I prefer the terminology of assumptions and conclusions connected by inference indica-
tor terms, in describing the informal logical anatomy of a typical argument and in the most 
general sense, deductive, inductive, or of any other type. Among assumptions in turn there 
can be both ordinary premises, if we choose to call them that, and the hypotheses of reduc-
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More  interesting  arguments  typically  have  more  than  one  assump-
tion,  and  sometimes  more  than  one  conclusion,  and  the  assumptions 
and  conclusions  can  be  related  together  in  any  of  several  ways.  The 
standard diagramming method is equipped with conventions to repre-
sent  arguments  in  which  multiple  assumptions  contribute  to  a  single 
conclusion, and single assumptions imply multiple conclusions.
3. ADDITIVE AND NONADDITIVE ASSUMPTIONS 
To begin with assumptions, the standard diagramming method depicts 
these as related in two ways, additively and nonadditively. 
Several assumptions taken together are sometimes required to support 
a conclusion or multiple conclusions, which would not follow if the as-
sumptions were not combined or supposed jointly to hold true. These as-
sumptions are said to be additive. They are diagrammed by connecting 
their  numbers  in  the  standard  argument  diagram  with  a  ‘+’  sign,  and 
drawing  a  horizontal  line  under  all  of  the  additive  assumptions,  as 
though they were being added together in an addition column in arith-
metic. Finally, an inference arrow is drawn, running from below the line 
to the conclusion or conclusions that are supposed to follow. Here is an 
example for the following argument, in which the conclusion follows 
from the combined logical input of two distinct assumptions.
1. All rattlesnakes are poisonous.
2. This snake is a rattlesnake.
—————————
3. This snake is poisonous.
The two assumptions in steps (1) and (2) are both required in order 
to support the conclusion in (3). Neither assumption by itself is sufficient 
to imply the conclusion. The additive relationship between the assump-
tions in upholding the conclusion is diagrammed in this way:
(1) + (2)
    
↓
(3)
Of course, it is possible for any number of assumptions to be additively 
related to the conclusion of an argument. Above we considered only the 
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have three, four, or, indeed, any number. Here is another example, this 
time involving three additive assumptions:
1. Either the Republicans or the Democrats will win the Senate.
2. If the Republicans win the Senate, universal health care will be indefinitely delayed 
by  their  desire  to  appease  conservative  members  of  the  AMA  who  oppose  universal 
health care.
3. If the Democrats win the Senate, universal health care will be indefinitely delayed 
because of internal party disagreement about how to finance the best health care pak-
kage.
—————————
4. Universal health care will be indefinitely delayed.
This argument is correctly diagrammed as involving three additive as-
sumptions in (1), (2), and (3), all of which are required to uphold the 
conclusion in (4):
(1) + (2) + (3)
——————
↓
(4)
Alternatively, assumptions can be nonadditive or independent in that 
they do not all need to be combined or supposed jointly to hold true in 
order to support the conclusion. This occurs, for example, when several 
different  reasons  each  give  sufficient  grounds  to  uphold  a conclusion. 
Nonadditive or independent assumptions in argument are diagrammed 
by writing the assumptions’ numbers above the conclusion or conclu-
sions, dispensing with the short horizontal line required in the case of 
additive assumptions, and drawing separate arrows from each, departing 
at an angle and converging on numbers representing the conclusion or 
conclusions. 
Here is a simple case of two assumptions nonadditively or inde-
pendently supporting the same conclusion (the relationships diagrammed 
below could hold for any number of two or more assumptions, and any 
number of one or more conclusions).
1. 5 is an odd number.
2. 7 is an odd number.
—————————
3. There is at least one odd number.
The nonadditive relation between assumptions (1) and (2) and the 
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(1)      (2)
  
(3)
The intuitive test for whether assumptions are additive or nonadditive 
is whether or not the conclusion would hold if one of the assumptions were 
eliminated. If it appears that the conclusion would still be adequately sup-
ported even if an assumption did not hold, then most probably that as-
sumption is independent of the others. If, on the other hand, it seems like-
ly that the conclusion would fail if any assumption were eliminated, then 
the assumptions are additive, and must be supposed jointly to hold in or-
der to imply the conclusion.
 In the above example involving the occurrence of odd numbers, ei-
ther assumption (1) by itself or (2) by itself would be enough to guaran-
tee the truth of the conclusion in (3) that there are at least some odd 
numbers. The reason is that a single example is sufficient to prove that 
there are at least some instances of the kind. If we eliminate assumption 
(1), the conclusion still follows on the strength of (2); if we eliminate as-
sumption (2), the conclusion still follows on the strength of (1). In the 
previous two examples, by contrast, the conclusion on reflection appears 
to be inadequately supported if any of the assumptions are eliminated. 
4. DIVERGING CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions that are supposed to follow from either additive or non-
additive assumptions can be also be diverging. This occurs when a single 
set of assumptions in additive or nonadditive configuration support sev-
eral  different  conclusions.  Consider,  for  example,  the  following  argu-
ment:
1. Tom is a rational animal.
—————————
2. Tom is rational.
3. Tom is an animal.
The diverging conclusions in (2) and (3) are diagrammed to show that 
they are equally implied by assumption (1), in this way:
(1)
 
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Multiple conclusions can also diverge from additive as well as single 
assumptions in an argument. Here is a specimen argument of this type: 
1. Picasso was a great painter.
2. All great painters are true artists and visual poets.
—————————
3. Picasso was a true artist.
4. Picasso was a visual poet.
The assumptions in (1) and (2) are clearly additive, since neither of 
the diverging conclusions in (3) or (4) follows from (1) alone or (2) alone. 
The diagram for this argument with diverging conclusions from additive 
assumptions has this form:
(1) + (2)
—————  
(3)      (4)
Multiple  conclusions  diverging  from  nonadditive  assumptions  are 
represented simply as parallel basic inferences. This is exhibited in the 
following argument and accompanying standard diagram:
1. Tom is a rational animal.
2. Oaks are deciduous trees.
—————————
3. Tom is an animal.
4. Oaks are trees.
(1)      (2)
↓    ↓
(3)      (4)
5. IMPLICIT ARGUMENT COMPONENTS FOR ENTHYMEMES 
As a final refinement of the standard diagramming method, the struc-
tural relationships between implicit or suppressed assumptions, conc-
lusions or inference indicators are interposed to reconstruct an expli-
citly deductively incomplete argument with all essential elements cha-
ritably added to maximize the argument’s prospects as a deductively 
valid  inference.  Such  a  potentially  significantly  reconstructed  argu-
ment is known as an enthymeme. The general idea is to present an ar-
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ach a deductively valid inference, and, perhaps more importantly, to 
appreciate the argument on its merits more in the way that we may 
imagine it to have been intended. We may want to learn more from 
the  argument  by  interpreting  it  as  involving  suppressed  argument 
components by which a variety of background considerations can be 
said  to  have  been  justifiably  taken  for  granted  by  the  argument  au-
thor. 
Here is an example of an argument that benefits from the interposi-
tion of implicit assumptions, along with a diagram representing what we 
might plausibly regard as its real more deeply underlying, rather than ex-
plicitly stated, structure. The argument is a modification of the previous 
example. First, we see the argument in deductively incomplete form as it 
might  be  most  directly  reconstructed  from  its  enthymematic  ordinary 
language expression.
1. Tom is a cat.
—————————
2. Tom is an animal.
The argument evidently leaves out an important assumption needed 
make the inference valid. This is obviously something like the assump-
tion that ‘All cats are animals’, or ‘Whatever is a cat is also an animal’. 
The missing or implicit assumption is supplied in this reconstruction, ac-
cording to the principle of charity, using the standard bracketing con-
vention for implicit argument components described above:
1. Tom is a cat.
[a. All cats are animals.]
—————————
2. Tom is an animal.
Now the conclusion in (2) explicitly follows deductively from (1) 
and [a]. Diagramming this expanded version of the argument by the 
convention  described  for  arguments  with  implicit  assumptions,  we 
have: 
(1) + [a]
——————
↓
(2)
This completes the standard set of diagramming methods. Diagram-
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and implicit additive and nonadditive assumptions and stated and im-
plicit converging and diverging conclusions. The standard method can 
be used to diagram any inferential relationships that belong to these cat-
egories, both simple and the most interesting and complex, built up out 
of simple inference units in complicated configurations. The method can 
also be extended to represent disputes involving the interrelation and 
contradiction of arguments and counterarguments. 
6. SUMMARY OF STANDARD DIAGRAMMING TECHNIQUES
The standard diagramming patterns for arguments with six types of rela-
tionships between assumptions and conclusions are summarized in the 
following chart.
STANDARD ARGUMENT DIAGRAMMING CONFIGURATIONS
(1) (1) + (2) (1)      (2) (1) + [a] (1) (1) + (2)
————— ————— —————
↓ ↓   ↓    
(2) (3) (3) (2) (2)      (3) (3)      (4)
Basic Additive 
Assumptions
Nonadditive 
Independent 
Assumptions 
Implicit
 (Additive) 
Components
Diverging Conclusions
The basic patterns in these standard rules for diagramming arguments are 
found in most introductory informal logic texts. They are similar in ob-
vious ways to the diagramming techniques used for analyzing the noun-
verb-modifier (etc.) structure of sentences in standard treatments of nat-
ural language grammars3.
An application of the standard diagramming method to a relatively 
complex argument is seen in the following example concerning the met-
aphysics of substance.
1. Substance is eternal.
2. Time is infinite.
3. If time is infinite, then whatever is eternal is uncreated and endures throughout in-
finite time.
3  Standard diagramming is emphasized as an informal diagnostic technique for evalu-
ating inferential validity by Kelley (1990: 85–160). See also Copi and Cohen (1994: 21–49); 
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4. If the world appears to change because substance is constantly changing, then the 
appearance and substance of the world are identical.
5. Substance cannot remain the same from instant to instant, because its existence ex-
plains the world’s continuously changing appearance.
6. Whatever endures through time is constantly changing.
—————————
7. Substance endures throughout infinite time.
8. Substance is uncreated.
9. Substance endures through time.
10. Substance is constantly changing.
11. The world appears to change because substance is constantly changing.
12. The appearance and substance of the world are identical.
The complex relations between the assumptions in propositions (1)–(6), 
and the subconclusions and main conclusions in propositions (7)–(12) can 
be standardly diagrammed in this way:
The standard diagramming method is complete in the sense that it 
can be used to diagram the inferential structure of any argument, valid 
or invalid, sound or unsound. The completeness and comprehensiveness 
of the method is assured by the definition of an argument as a sequence 
of propositions distinguished as assumptions and conclusions by infer-
ence indicator terms. Regardless of its complexity, the argument compo-
nents of any argument can always be numbered, implicit components 
can be interposed in brackets and labeled by letters of the alphabet, the 
stated and implicit assumptions can be distinguished as additive or non-
additive, the stated and implicit conclusions can be distinguished as di-
vergent or nondivergent, and the stated and implicit assumptions and 
conclusions so distinguished can in every case be related by direct, con-
vergent, or divergent inference arrows. 336  Dale JACQUETTE 
7. LIMITATIONS OF STANDARD DIAGRAMMING
The diagramming method provides a way of representing some of the in-
ference relationships that hold between any argument’s stated and impli-
cit assumptions and conclusions. There are nevertheless some important 
elements of the logical structure of an argument that the diagramming me-
thod does not picture. The standard diagramming method is complete in 
a sense, as far as it goes, but it is also limited. It is not as informative as it 
might  be  about  the  inferential  relationship  between  certain  kinds  of  as-
sumptions and conclusions.
We notice at once that the diagramming method does not distinguish 
between many types of widely diverging arguments that all share the ex-
act same inference diagram. This is clear in the case of any argument in 
which two assumptions are additively required to deduce a conclusion. 
All such arguments must be diagrammed in precisely the same way, re-
gardless of the content of the assumptions and conclusion, and regard-
less of the logical connections and relations that may obtain between the 
assumptions and conclusion by virtue of which the conclusion is sup-
posed to follow from the assumptions. Here are two examples of quite 
distinct  arguments  which  we  are  required  by  standard  diagramming 
methods to picture as having the very same inference structure. 
1. If it is raining, then the rooftops are wet.  1. Alice is taller than Bob. 
2. It is raining.        2. Someone is taller than Alice.
—————————        —————————
3. The rooftops are wet.      3. Someone is taller than Bob.
The two arguments are logically fundamentally very different from 
one another. The argument on the left is a familiar form of conditional 
detachment or modus ponendo ponens. The argument on the right is an 
inference involving the transitivity of the relation or relational property 
of being taller than. Both arguments are, nevertheless, standardly dia-
grammed in exactly the same way, by the familiar additive assumptions 
diagram, with a horizontal line beneath the two assumption numbers 
joined by an addition sign, from which a vertical arrow below points to 
the  conclusion  number.  The  two  arguments  share  precisely  the  same 
standard diagram form:
(1) + (2)
————
↓
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Although  the  standard  diagramming  method  tells  us  something 
about an argument’s inferential structure in the relation between its as-
sumptions and conclusions, it also leaves out important features that ide-
ally we might like to have represented. Notice in particular that in using 
the standard diagramming method we have no good way to represent 
the branching structure of dilemma arguments, in which two (or more) 
choices lead to the same conclusions. This is seen in a comparison of the 
following two arguments:
1. Either it will rain or snow.      1. Roses are red.
2. If it rains, then the rooftops will be wet.  2. Violets are blue.
3. If it snows, then the rooftops will be wet.  3. Sugar is sweet.
—————————        —————————
4. The rooftops will be wet.      4. Roses are red, violets are    
            blue, and sugar is sweet.
The argument on the left is a disjunctive dilemma. The argument on 
the right is a conjunctive inference, in which the conclusion merely col-
lects together the three assertions individually stated by the assumptions. 
Despite these differences, both arguments once again must be standard-
ly diagrammed as having precisely the same inferential structure. The ar-
guments are additive as above, though this time each incorporates three 
instead of two additive assumptions in support of the conclusion. They 
share this common form:
(1) + (2) + (3)
——————
↓
(4)
Another limitation of the standard diagramming method is its inabil-
ity  to  depict  the  inferential  relation  between  the  conclusions  and  as-
sumptions of a deductively circular or question-begging argument or pe-
titio principii. The standard method depicts logical inference in a petitio 
as  extending  from  assumptions  to  conclusions,  but  fails  to  depict  the 
backward inference from conclusions to assumptions by virtue of which 
an argument is caught in circularity. The standard diagram of a circular 
argument is indistinguishable from the standard diagram of many non-
circular arguments. Consider these inferences:
1. God exists.     1. God exists.
—————————    —————————
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Both arguments are naturally diagrammed in the same way, with the 
same numbering of assumptions and conclusions, and an inference ar-
row extending from the one and only assumption to the one and only 
conclusion, (1) → (2). Yet the argument on the left is unmistakably cir-
cular, while the argument on the right is not. We can write the vertical 
equivalent of (1) → (1), (1) | (1) or (1) → (2), (1) | (2), where [(2) = (1)], 
to show that the argument’s conclusion merely repeats one of the as-
sumptions. There are unfortunately objections to this practice in some 
cases, which makes the proposal unsuitable for diagramming all circular 
reasoning. The problem is that in many arguments circularity does not 
appear simply between a proposition and itself, but, as far as the argu-
ment’s inferential structure is concerned, by means of syntactically dis-
tinct propositions, in some instances, quite distant from one another in 
immediate lexical content. More importantly still, the problem in circu-
lar argument is not merely that (1) → (2), where (2) in some way restates 
(1), but rather that (2) → (1). This is true of the argument above on the 
left, but not of the argument on the right. To show this structural feature 
of circular reasoning we need an arrow that literally circles back from 
a conclusion of the argument in which it occurs and singles out the as-
sumption  by  virtue  of  which  its  conclusion  is  trivialized.  We  need  in 
compact diagrammatic form the fact that where (1) → (2), it is also the 
case that (2) → (1), as provided in the enhancement. If we are sensitive 
to the particularities of circular arguments more generally, in complex as 
well as in the simplest applications, then we will already be aware that 
circularity sometimes only affects part of an argument, and that it is of-
ten useful to know at a glance exactly which sub-inferences are caught 
up in circularity, and which are free of that complaint. 
Finally, reductio ad absurdum arguments are evidently indistinguisha-
ble as special argument forms by the standard diagramming method. The 
standard method has no provision for representing the status of assump-
tions introduced only for purposes of indirect proof, sometimes referred 
to as reductio ‘hypotheses’, to be rejected as false when reduced to an ab-
surdity  or  when  a  logical  contradiction  is  deduced.  The  standard  dia-
gramming method cannot show that at least some of the assumptions of 
a reductio argument contribute additively to the argument’s conclusion 
in an importantly different way, by supporting a contradiction that leads 
to the assumption’s rejection. The relationship between explicitly stated 
and  implicit  assumptions  and  conclusions  is  usually  diagrammed  by 
making some implicit assumptions explicit as opposed to explicitly stat-
ed assumptions and conclusions, labeling them by letters of the alpha-
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than parentheses in the diagram. We shall generally follow a version of 
this convention, although other equally and potentially more informa-
tive alternative graphic devices may also be available. 
8. PROPOSAL TO ENHANCE STANDARD DIAGRAMMING
The  moral  of  these  illustrations  is  not  that  standard  diagramming  is 
hopelessly faulty. The point is rather that we should be aware of some of 
the limitations of the diagramming method, and not expect more infor-
mation from the method than it is capable of providing. Logically inter-
esting features by which some arguments are distinguished even infor-
mally from one another are invisible to standard diagramming.
Perhaps the main failure of the standard diagramming method is its 
failure to exhibit any of the internal structural features of assumptions 
and conclusions that are relevant to their inferential relationships. The 
standard method has no way of showing that one proposition is the 
negation of another, or that a proposition is disjunctive, conjunctive, 
conditional, or biconditional in form. These characteristics of proposi-
tions are vitally important to the logical connections that govern in-
ference  relations  between  an  argument’s  assumptions  and  conclu-
sions.
It is worthwhile for these reasons to consider substantial revisions of 
the standard diagramming method. For the present it will suffice to illus-
trate the possibilities of enhancing standard diagramming by proposing 
innovations that will make it possible to diagram the internal structures 
of arguments more sensitively with respect to the internal logical form 
and content of their assumptions and conclusions, in these categories: 
(i) circular or question-begging arguments (petitio principii); (ii) disjunc-
tive  dilemma  (and  disjunctive  syllogism);  (iii)  conditional  inferences 
(modus  ponens,  modus  tollens,  hypothetical  syllogism,  and  combined 
types); (iv) reductio ad absurdum arguments.
9. DIAGRAMMING CIRCULARITY
The circularity in question-begging or petitio principii arguments can be 
graphically represented by running a half-circle arrow in the argument’s 
diagram from the conclusions or subconclusions to the assumptions the 
conclusions or subconclusion presuppose. This indicates pictorially in an 
immediately intuitive way that there is an inferential relation not only 340  Dale JACQUETTE 
from top to bottom in the diagram, as we expect in a noncircular argu-
ment, but also bottom to top, as the mark of circular reasoning4. 
To show the circularity that obtains in arguments where the conclu-
sion must already be accepted in order to accept the argument’s assump-
tions in the simplest case, such as the reiterative example above in which 
the conclusion that God exists is deduced from the assumption that God 
exists, we make use of a (semi-) circle or looping inference pattern:
In some applications, we can represent inferential circularity as previ-
ously mentioned by writing (1) → (1) or (1) | (1)5. Such a method is pro-
posed already by Beardsley, but it is clearly suboptimal6. If our purpose 
is to differently number every syntactically distinct proposition, howev-
er, then this strictly reiterative diagramming device will not be equal to 
the task. If I argue: An infinite spirit reigns supreme throughout the uni-
verse, therefore, God exists, I will have engaged in an especially blatant 
manifest  circularity,  but  the  reasoning  is  not  readily  represented  by 
(1) → (1) or (1) | (1). If we try to fill in the suppressed assumptions in this 
way:  (1)  An  infinite  spirit  reigning  supreme  in  the  universe  exists  + 
[(a) God = an infinite spirit reigning supreme in the universe] → (2) God 
exists, then the circularity is just as present as before, but it is not graph-
ically displayed either as (1) + (2) → (3), (1) + (2) → (1) or (1) + (2) → (2). 
The first effort does not graphically indicate circularity even by labeling, 
and the second two do not accurately number distinct propositions ex-
pressing different meanings.
Circularity, even in a single argument, is often more difficult than this 
to represent. Question-begging inferences that are spread out over a se-
ries of subarguments can occur in which one conclusion or subconclu-
sion  is  linked  to  another  main  conclusion  in  a  circular  configuration. 
Here is an example:
(A)  1. If it is hard to find the circularity in a series of arguments, then circularity can take 
us by surprise. 
2. It is sometimes hard to find the circularity in a series of arguments.
—————————
3. Circularity in some series of arguments can take us by surprise.
4  Cf. Jacquette (1993); Jacquette (1994a).
5  Throught, ‘→’ in not the material conditional, but a horizontal sign for the vertical 
inferential arrow in standard argument diagramming.
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(B)  1. To be taken by surprise is to encounter the unexpected.
2. The circularity in a series of argument is unexpected only when it is hard to find.
[a. The circularity in some series of arguments can take us by surprise.] 
[from (A)]
—————————
3. It is sometimes hard to find the circularity in a series of arguments.
The circularity is seen in the fact that the conclusion of (B) follows in 
part from the conclusion of (A), while it is also at the same time one of (A)’s 
assumptions. The same proposition appears as (B3) and (A2), which in con-
tent are precisely identical. This constitutes a circularity in the series (A)–
(B). The main conclusion of (B), which derives in part from (A), is already 
assumed in (A), in this circular series of arguments. We must already accept 
the conclusion of (B) in order to accept the second assumption of (A), in 
order to derive the conclusion of (B). Thus, we assume what we are trying 
to prove. The circularity can be diagrammed in a self-explanatory way:
Diagramming circularity by a (semi-) circular or looping graphic de-
vice is the easiest and most obvious method of enhancing standard dia-
gramming in order to represent an important inferential structural fea-
ture of many arguments that is otherwise overlooked or graphically less 
informatively depicted by the standard method. 
10. CONVENTIONS FOR DIAGRAMMING CONTRADICTION  
AND DISJUNCTION
To continue, we require special conventions for representing contradiction 
and disjunction. We can borrow an icon used in diagramming disputes be-
tween multiple arguments, by which conflict arrows bisected by short slant-
bars indicate that the propositions so related are mutually contradictory7. 
7  Cf. Kelley (1990: 151–160). Kelley (1990: 152) refers to conflict arrows as ‘negative ar-
rows’. I have borrowed this device for representing contradictory propositions as one that 
has already gained recognition among informal logicians for diagramming disputes involv-
ing  arguments  and  counterarguments.  A  disadvantage  of  the  symbol,  even  for  Kelley’s 342  Dale JACQUETTE 
Thus, in the diagram below, propositions (1) and (2) are shown to be logi-
cally incompatible or contradictories: 
Exploiting the fact that in classical inference semantics a contradic-
tion implies any and every proposition (sometimes known as one form 
of the paradox of material implication and one form of the paradox of 
strict implication), we can further use conflict arrows together with the 
horizontal  line  and  inference  arrow  to  diagram  the  inference  of  any 
proposition (3) from any mutually logically incompatible or contradicto-
ry propositions (1) and (2), in the following T-pattern diagram:
This device will prove useful later in diagramming conditional infer-
ences  and  reductio  ad  absurdum  arguments.  Alternative  conventions 
might  be  developed  for  nonclassical  valid  inference  systems,  such  as 
those available in relevance and paraconsistent logics.
Another new diagramming method is required to represent the com-
position of a disjunction by its disjuncts. If proposition (1) is the disjunc-
tion a or b, then we can picture its internal disjunctive logical structure 
in the following intuitive way as a delta pattern. 
Proposition (1) is shown to consist of the two disjuncts, a and b. The 
two disjuncts are labeled by letters of the alphabet rather than numbers, 
enclosed within boxes, at the ends of diverging lines. This convention is 
appropriate, because by hypothesis the disjuncts are not explicitly given 
in  the  argument  statement  as  distinct  propositions,  but  are  contained 
within the disjunction. There is nothing significant about the choice of 
graphic purposes, is that an inference arrow divided by a slant-bar more naturally suggests 
that the inference from proposition to proposition merely does not hold, rather than that 
one proposition is logically incompatible with or contradicts the other. C. S. Peirce’s meth-
od of Existential Graphs (EGs) nealty solves this problem by permittig any combination of 
propositional symbols to be circled in order to indicate graphically that the propositions 
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boxes  to  enclose  the  terms  representing  the  disjuncts,  but  something 
comparable is needed to distinguish them graphically from the parenthe-
ses used to represent stated argument components and the square brack-
ets used to represent the implicit argument components in the recon-
struction of enthymemes. The boxed terms appear at the end of diverging 
lines in the delta configuration to depict the fact that the disjunction al-
lows the truth of either one or the other or both possibilities represent-
ed by its disjuncts. The idea is to show something like alternative paths 
or channels that might be taken. The lines are tipped with inference ar-
rowheads. Divergent arrows terminating in boxed letters as opposed to 
paranthetical numbers do not indicate divergent conclusions, but diver-
gent possible conclusions a divergent disjunctive possibilities.
11. DIAGRAMMING DISJUNCTIVE INFERENCES
The conventions proposed in the previous section make it relatively easy 
to diagram disjunctive arguments. We notice that in the absence of such 
methods disjunctive arguments are not distinguished as having any special 
inferential structure by standard diagramming. The standard method does 
not exhibit the internal logical connectives by which simpler propositions 
are truth-functionally combined into more complex composites. 
Consider  an  elementary  instantiation  of  argument  by  disjunctive 
(sometimes called constructive) dilemma:
1. Either today is Monday or today is Tuesday.
2. If today is Monday, then today is a weekday.
3. If today is Tuesday, then today is a weekday.
—————————
4. Today is a weekday.
As  observed  above,  this  argument  is  pictured  by  the  standard  dia-
gramming method as nothing but an inference involving three additive 
assumptions supporting the conclusion. By representing the disjunctive 
composition of proposition (1) as consisting of the disjuncts a (Today is 
Monday) or b (Today is Tuesday), together with the conditional assump-
tions in (2) and (3), we can graphically depict the dilemma structure of 
the argument in a more interesting and informative way. By this meth-
od, the two possibilities contained within the disjunction, and the fact 
that either choice leads to or converges on the same outcome or conclu-
sion, are visually obvious. The diagram in this case can be referred to as 
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We shall return to this example in the next section immediately fol-
lowing. There we will further exhibit the logic of conditional inference 
from the boxed disjuncts a and b in the disjunctive composition of (1) 
and the conditional propositions in (2) and (3) (unanalyzed here) as con-
verging on the conclusion in (4).
The fruitfulness of this enhancement of standard diagramming tech-
niques  is  seen  in  the  following  application.  Disjunctive  syllogism  is  a 
popular argument form in which a disjunction is advanced, and all but 
one of the disjuncts are rejected, from which the remaining disjunct is 
validly  inferred.  This  is  also  the  underlying  logic  of  reasoning  by  ‘ex-
hausting the alternatives’, leaving the one unrejected possibility as the 
only conclusion. By the enlargement of the diagramming method pro-
posed here, inferences by disjunctive syllogism are readily identifiable as 
special case instances of disjunctive dilemma.
Take the following disjunctive syllogism as an example.
1. Either the Pro-Life advocates or the Pro-Choice advocates will triumph in their Su-
preme Court battle.
2. But the Pro-Life advocates will not triumph.
—————————
3. The Pro-Choice advocates will triumph in their Supreme Court battle.
Using both the disjunctive composition lines to indicate the disjuncts 
of which assumption (1) is composed, and conflict arrows to show that 
one of the disjuncts a (The Pro-Life advocates will triumph) contradicts 
assumption (2) (The Pro-Life advocates will not triumph), along with the 
fact that any proposition follows from such a contradiction, the infer-
ence is naturally pictured as a particular form of disjunctive dilemma, in 
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The notation by which a proposition in the diagram is identified un-
der different terms provides a useful reminder of the proposition’s con-
tent, or what it expresses, but is unnecessary in applying the enhanced 
diagramming method to represent more sensitively the internal proposi-
tional relations within an inferential structure.
12. DIAGRAMMING CONDITIONAL INFERENCES
The fact that conditional propositions are truth-functionally reducible to 
disjunctions, in which the negation of the conditional’s antecedent is 
disjoined with the conditional’s consequent, can be invoked to enhance 
the standard diagramming method in representing conditional inferenc-
es such as modus ponens, modus tollens, hypothetical syllogism, and relat-
ed forms. Any conditional proposition can be diagrammed as a disjunc-
tion of two disjuncts, to adopt a univocal convention, with the negation 
of the antecedent on the left fork, and the consequent on the right.
This choice represents an interpretation of the conditional in infor-
mal logic as a material conditional, and as such requires justification. Al-
though the diagramming method developed here is intended as an ad-
junct to informal deductive reasoning in the paradigm, we consider the 
material conditional also as it is defined in formal symbolic logic. The ex-
planation is that: 
(1) It is simpler, more univocal and better understood than other con-
ditionals.
(2) There is nothing inherently formalist about understanding condi-
tional statements in relation to disjunction and negation, which, indeed, 
can be done formally or informally.
(3) By interpreting conditionals even informally as the material con-
ditional, also interpreted informally, we establish and illustrate the fact 
that the resources for defining the material conditional are already avail-
able to informal logic, ancillary to the concept of a mathematical logical 
truth function.
(4) There are many candidate conditionals beyond the material con-
ditional whose deductive inferential structure, as in modus ponens and tol-
lens, is properly explicated in relation to disjunction and negation (or 
equivalently, but graphically more complexly, to conjunction and nega-
tion),  and  it  would  be  prejudicial  even  to  their  informal  critique  to 
choose from among them.
(5) It would be a serious distraction, in the present context, to treat 
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types of conditionals over others with no available graphic guidelines as 
to  how  each  might  be  applied  to  ostensibly  different  colloquial  argu-
ments, where there is in fact no better way to represent the inferential 
logical structure involving any nonmaterial conditional proposition ex-
cept by the previously discounted equivocal (X) → (Y).
(6) Finally, informal logic need not be seen as isolated from formal 
symbolic logic, but rather as an ally, part of a spectrum of methods con-
tributing in different ways to a complete logical analysis of an argument. 
We may begin informally at some level or point of historical origin, and 
end  with  the  most  sophisticated  notations,  axiomatizations  and  algo-
rithms of contemporary mathematical logic, set theory, and their formal 
semantics. If informal logic is understood as at least potentially part of 
such a spectrum of methods, if we do not have good reasons for exclud-
ing it as such, then enhanced diagramming in informal logic, without 
shaming its informal ethos, can nevertheless welcome the graphic dia-
gramming, itself an inherently formal activity and end-result, of inferen-
tial relations in ways that dovetail smoothly with their counterparts in 
formal symbolic logic8. The example of note in the present application 
is that of reading the logical structure of conditionals in enhanced dia-
gramming as that of material conditionals. 
There still remains the greatest difference in the world between for-
mal and informal logical treatment of the material conditional, since our 
preferred choices for enhanced argument diagramming do not, signifi-
cantly,  have  anything  to  say  about  truth  values,  the  conditional  as 
a truth function, about truth table definitions of the conditional by cas-
es, or about decision methods for the conditional or any of the rest of an 
algebraic  propositional  logic  to  which  the  material  conditional  might 
formally belong, and in terms of whose interrelations with which it can 
only be fully understood. Enhanced argument diagramming, though still 
squarely part of informal logic, thereby makes a point of positive contact 
with  symbolic  logic  and  facilitates  one  transition  of  analytic  methods 
from established informal to established formal concepts, notations, and 
techniques. For these reasons, and with this informal justification, we 
consider the deductive logical-inferential structure of conditional reason-
ing to be that of the material conditional, for purposes of advancing an 
enhanced diagramming method in informal logic. The alternative, again, 
seems only to be the rather logically opaque and indistinct one-size-fits-
all diagramming of conditionals generally as (X) → (Y). We show a de-
ductively inferentially relevant internal structure belonging to (X) → (Y) 
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by relating the → symbol to prior graphically interpreted and intuitively 
transparent  informally  understood  devices  for  diagramming  negation 
and disjunction. If there is both a preferred nonmaterial conditional that 
contributes to deductively valid reasoning and can be distinctively dia-
grammed as to its logical structure and contribution to deductive infer-
ence as something more logically informative than (X)  → (Y), then it 
would  make  a  splendid  addition  to  enhanced  diagramming  in  formal 
logic to set beside the proposed graphic analysis of the material condi-
tional. Suffice it to say that such a proposal has yet to appear on the ho-
rizon.
Continuing now with the most basic form of modus ponens, we repre-
sent the inference by the identical diagram used above to depict the log-
ical structure of one basic form of disjunctive syllogism, indicating their 
logical equivalence and interreducibility. Here is a conditional modus po-
nens rephrasing of the argument used to illustrate disjunctive syllogism:
1. If the Pro-Life advocates do not triumph, then the Pro-Choice advocates will triumph 
in their Supreme Court battle.
2. But the Pro-Life advocates will not triumph.
—————————
3. The Pro-Choice advocates will triumph in their Supreme Court battle.
The diagram for the revised argument by the proposed enhancement 
has the very same pictorial structure, a variation of the diamond pattern, 
as that presented for disjunctive syllogism:
Similarly,  modus  tollens  conditional  inferences  are  reducible  in  this 
fashion, interestingly, as mirror-images of modus ponens arguments. Here 
is an ordinary language example and its corresponding diagram involv-
ing the reduction of the conditional major assumption (1) to a logically 
equivalent  disjunction,  and  the  dilemma  convergence  on  a  common 
conclusion.  This  time,  the  convergence  occurs  by  inference  from  the 
contradiction of the conditional’s consequent and the argument’s minor 
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1. If the Pro-Life advocates do not triumph, then the Pro-Choice advocates will triumph 
in their Supreme Court battle.
2. But the Pro-Choice advocates will not triumph.
—————————
3. The Pro-Choice advocates will triumph in their Supreme Court battle.
The diagram for modus tollens has this corresponding form. Conver-
gence on the conclusion this time is effected by contradiction with the 
argument’s minor assumption on the right, rather than, as in the case of 
modus ponens, on the left.
By extensions of the same diagramming methods, the logical infer-
ence in hypothetical syllogism, involving two conditional assumptions, 
and a conditional conclusion, in which the antecedent of the first as-
sumption and the consequent of the second assumption are condition-
ally related as antecedent and consequent of the conclusion, can also be 
depicted. Here is a diagram in what we shall call the butterfly pattern for 
a simple example of hypothetical syllogism:
1. If we win the match, we win the game.
2. If we win the game, we win the tournament.
—————————
3. If we win the match, we win the tournament. 
The diagram is clearly more informative than the standard rendering 
by which assumptions (1) and (2) are pictured merely as contributing ad-
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Structures like this are now obtained for related inferences combining 
the features of hypothetical syllogism with modus ponens or modus tollens. 
The first is an argument form in which conditional assumptions of the 
form, If P, then Q; If Q, then R; and an assumption of the first condition-
al’s antecedent P; supporting the conclusion, therefore, R. The pattern of 
interpretation  by  reduction  of  conditionals  to  equivalent  disjunctive 
forms is predictable enough at this point to see at a glance how the en-
hanced diagramming method works when applied to reductions of suc-
cessive conditionals as disjunctions.
1. If you give a mouse a cracker, she might want a cookie.
2. If a mouse might want a cookie, she might also want a muffin.
3. You give a mouse a cracker.
—————————
4. A mouse might also want a muffin. 
It is important to notice that although proposition Q is shared by the 
first and second conditional assumptions, as consequent of the first and 
antecedent of the second, the same terms do not appear as shared by the 
conditionals when they are reduced to disjunctive form. This is because 
the consequent Q in the first conditional is retained upon reduction to 
the equivalent disjunction, while the antecedent of the second condi-
tional is reduced in the equivalent disjunction as not-Q. These are ac-
cordingly diagrammed with different boxed alphabet letters, b for Q, and 
c for not-Q, and their mutual logical incompatibility or contradiction is 
represented by the conflict arrow convention. 
The second example is the mirror-image of the first, in the same way 
and for the same reason that the modified diamond diagram for modus 
tollens is the mirror-image of the modified diamond diagram for modus 
ponens.  Consider  the  problem  of  diagramming  conditional  arguments 
like the following:
1. If I could afford it, I’d buy you a new car. 
2. I’d buy you a new car, if money grows on trees.
3. Money doesn’t grow on trees.
—————————
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As a final example in this category, let us return to the disjunctive di-
lemma  considered  earlier.  The  first  assumption  is  a  disjunction  of  the 
form, P or Q, and the second and third assumptions are conditionals of 
the general form, If P, then R, and If Q, then R. The conclusion that R 
follows by dilemma. Now we can represent the logical structure of the 
argument in more detail by further reducing the second and third con-
ditional  assumptions  to  disjunctive  form.  When  we  do  this,  the  en-
hanced diagramming method yields the following variation of a butter-
fly diagram of its inferential relations:
13. DIAGRAMMING INDIRECT PROOF OR REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM
In order to diagram reductio  ad  absurdum arguments, it is necessary to 
have a convention for representing assumptions introduced only as hy-
potheses for purposes of indirect proof, to be rejected when a contradic-
tion is derived in part or in whole from them.
Whereas in non-reductio arguments the assumptions with which an 
argument begins remain the argument’s assumptions throughout, in 
reductio arguments the negations of false assumptions are asserted as 
the  argument’s  conclusion.  For  this  reason,  it  is  appropriate  in  dia-
gramming reductio arguments to distinguish reductio assumptions from 
the other (sincere) assumptions in an argument by placing the num-
bers (or alphabet letters in the case of implicit reductio assumptions re-
quired  in  the  reconstruction  of  enthymemes)  that  represent  them 
within angle brackets: < >.
We can use this device even in reconstructing arguments from ordi-
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analogous to the procedure involving square brackets in reconstructing 
enthymemes with implicit argument components. Consider this reductio 
argument: 
<1. Susan will not run for President.>
2. If Susan does not run for President, then Mark will not run for Vice-President.
3. Mark will run for Vice-President.
—————————
4. Mark will not run for Vice-President.
5. Susan will run for President.
The inference is not difficult to represent. The basic reductio strategy 
can nevertheless be built into much more complicated argument struc-
tures. The logic of the argument is pictured in this diagram. The essen-
tial diagramming element is the T-pattern: 
The argument is diagrammed by indicating the essential features of 
reductio assumptions and the absurd consequences that are supposed 
to follow from them. Angle brackets mark the reductio assumption to 
be rejected upon deduction of a logically contradictory consequence. 
To  indicate  that  a  logically  contradictory  consequence  has  been  de-
duced, we use conflict arrows, as previously, to represent the fact that 
the propositions represented by corresponding numbers are logically 
incompatible.
One further convention that we deliberately do not adopt is the use 
of such a device as ‘<’ and ‘>’ or ‘<<’ and ‘>>’ to mark the conclusions 
in a reductio inference that follow only from the reductio hypothesis or 
hypotheses. The main reason for this decision is that many reductio in-
ferences are deductively valid despite undercertainty as to which con-
clusion should be regarded as dependent on the reductio hypothesis or 
hypotheses. This is often a matter of dispute between an argument au-
thor and the argument’s critics, and we should not prejudice the prop-
er  interpretation  merely  in  diagramming  the  argument’s  inferential 
structure.
Where we have a relatively clear and confidant command of a reduc-
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track of the direct inferences from reductio hypotheses in the argument. 
Such information may be useful when we have it, but often in diagram-
ming  arguments  we  do  not  know  a  reductio  argument  author’s  inten-
tions. However, the most important objection to making the direct con-
clusions of reductio inferences stand out in the diagramming convention 
is that it requires diagrammer to have already fully interpreted the argu-
ment before diagramming its structure, whereas the purpose of argument 
diagramming is precisely to facilitate an understanding of the argument’s 
inferential structure. Making that kind of labeling a requirement for dia-
gramming  puts  the  cart  before  the  horse,  and  undermines  one  of  the 
principal reasons for diagramming the logical inferential structures of de-
ductive  and  other  arguments.  If  we  must  know  what  conclusions  are 
meant in earnest, and which are merely the implications of hypotheses 
we know to be false, in order to diagram an argument, then there seems 
little point in actually making the diagram. At least in those general in-
stances when we are using diagramming in order to understand inferen-
tial structure, we may prefer not to mark the diagrams more than we 
need to in order to reflect the argument’s internal inferential relations. 
We do not want to impose requirements on diagramming methods that 
might not be obviously or univocally fulfilled in all relevant applications, 
that do not in any case contribute to our understanding of deductive 
connections within the argument, and especially not if their restrictions 
preclude it from being used in all of the sorts of ways expected of argu-
ment diagramming. The diagrams are nevertheless to use as we see fit, so 
we certainly can mark them in any way we choose, including annotat-
ing the conclusions of reductio inferences, if doing so serves a practical 
purpose.
Here  is  another  example,  a  simplified  variation  of  Euclid’s  famous 
proof that there is no greatest prime number. Suppose I want to prove 
that there is no greatest even number. I assume the opposite of the con-
clusion I hope to establish, by beginning with the proposition that there 
is a greatest even number, which I call ‘N’. If N is an even number, no 
matter how great, I can always obtain an even number greater than N by 
adding N + 2. Thus, I have reduced the assumption that there is a great-
est  even  number  to  an  absurdity,  an  outright  logical  contradiction  — 
that N is the greatest even number, and N is not the greatest even number 
(since N + 2 is an even number greater than N)9. 
The reductio argument to prove that there is no greatest even number 
can first be reconstructed in the following way: 
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<1. There is a greatest even number, N.>
2. If N is an even number, then N + 2 is an even number greater than N.
—————————
3. N + 2 is an even number greater than N.
4. N is the greatest even number.
5. N is not the greatest even number.    
6. There is no greatest even number.
The  diagram  for  this  basic  reductio  argument  has  this  form,  where 
again the T-pattern depicts the main point of logical interest:
14. ENHANCED METHOD ILLUSTRATED 
To demonstrate the advantages of the proposed enhanced diagramming 
method, we shall consider a contrived logic textbook argument of gratu-
itous reductio reasoning, for purposes of illustrating enhanced diagram-
ming of its inferential structure, and compare both kinds of diagrams. If 
we begin with the reconstructed inference, then we do not identify any 
assumptions as hypotheses of the reductio. The argument states:
1. All humans are mortal.
2. Not everyone has the good fortune to visit Carthage.
3. Either it’s not the case that all humans are mortal, or I’m a monkey’s uncle.
4. If not everyone has the good fortune to visit Carthage, then I’m not a monkey’s 
uncle.
5. If it’s not the case that all humans are mortal, then not everyone has the good for-
tune to visit Carthage.
—————————
6. I’m a monkey’s uncle.
7. Everyone has the good fortune to visit Carthage.
8. It’s not the case that all humans are mortal.
9. Not everyone has the good fortune to visit Carthage.
10. If it’s not the case that all humans are mortal, then I’m not a monkey’s uncle.
11. Not everyone has the good fortune to visit Carthage, and if it’s not the case that all 
humans are mortal, then I’m not a monkey’s uncle.354  Dale JACQUETTE 
This sequence is easily identified as a valid inference. How should it 
be diagrammed for purposes of analysis in informal logic? The standard 
diagramming method has the following form:
(1) + (3)
————
↓
(6) + (4)
————
↓
(7) + (2)
————
↓
(8) + (5) (4) + (5)
———— ————
↓ ↓
      ( 9 )      +       ( 1 0 )
——————————    
(11)
One might falsely conclude from the standard diagram that the ar-
gument involves only one logical operation, since all the inferences 
must be standardly represented as simply additive. There are, howev-
er, six distinct types of inference, and a vicious circularity contained 
within the argument, to which the standard diagram is oblivious. The 
depth of detail provided by the enhanced diagramming method is 
apparent in this alternative formulation, in which the argument’s cir-
cularity, and its combined disjunctive syllogism, two kinds of condi-
tional detachment, hypothetical syllogism, reductio ad absurdum, and 
conjunctive  inferences,  are  easily  discernible  in  the  combination  of 
characteristic  modular  diagramming  patterns  previously  described. 
This is what the inferential structure of the argument looks like graph-
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15. EXTRA CREDIT PROBLEM ON SHERLOCK HOLMES’ LOGIC
As a final example, here is a challenge for the reader. The argument appe-
ars as part of Sherlock Holmes’ reasoning in The Adventure of the Cardboard 
Box. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s master detective is called in to investigate a 
peculiar occurrence in which a woman has been sent a small cardboard box 
packed with salt and containing two severed human ears. 
Holmes answered, “and for my part I shall set about... by presuming that my reasoning is 
correct, and that a double murder has been committed. One of these ears is a woman’s, 
small, finely formed, and pierced for an earring. The other is a man’s, sun-burned, disco-
loured,  and  also  pierced  for  an  earring.  These  two  people  are  presumably  dead,  or  we 
should have heard their story before now. To-day is Friday. The packet was posted on 
Thursday morning. The tragedy, then, occurred on Wednesday or Tuesday, or earlier. If 
the two people were murdered, who but their murderer would have sent this sign of his 
work to Miss Cushing? We may take it that the sender of the packet is the man whom we 
want. But he must have some strong reason for sending Miss Cushing this packet. What 
reason then? It must have been to tell her that the deed was done! or to pain her, perhaps. 
But in that case she knows who it is. Does she know? I doubt it. If she knew, why should 
she call the police in? She might have buried the ears, and no one would have been the 
wiser. That is what she would have done if she had wished to shield the criminal. But if 
she does not wish to shield him she would give his name. There is a tangle here which 
needs straightening out” (Doyle 1986: 327–328).356  Dale JACQUETTE 
Holmes is evidently engaged in a tricky bit of cogitation about the pos-
sibilities posed by Miss Cushing’s receipt of the mysterious and grisly box. 
We can reconstruct this argument, as far as Holmes takes it in the above 
passage, with a bit of additional information from later in the story, and 
then diagram it according to the standard method as a preliminary step 
leading toward a more complete critical evaluation. The argument is inter-
esting, because it is enthymematic, and involves multiple implicit inference 
components. It contains an implicit double reductio ad absurdum from two 
distinct but related reductio assumptions, an inference by disjunctive syllo-
gism,  and  several  types  of  conditional  inferences.  The  reductio  subargu-
ments are not completed until later in the story. For convenience, the rel-
evant assumption, unstated in the passage quoted above, is introduced in 
[e] as implicit. The following reconstruction seems appropriate:
1. A double murder has been committed of the two persons whose ears were contained 
in the box.
2.  One of the ears is small, finely formed, and pierced for an earring.
   [a. A small, finely formed ear pierced for an earring probably belongs to a woman.]
3. The other ear belongs to a man, and is sunburned, discolored, and pierced for an ear-
ring.
4. If the two persons to whom the ears belong were not dead (murdered), we would 
have heard about what happened to them before now.
   [b. We have not heard about what happened to the persons to whom the ears be-
long before now.]
5. The ears were mailed to Miss Cushing on Thursday morning.
6. If the two people were murdered, then it was the murderer who sent the ears to Miss 
Cushing.
<7. If the murderer sent the ears to Miss Cushing, then the murderer has a strong rea-
son for sending the ears to Miss Cushing.>
<8. If the murderer had a strong reason for sending the ears to Miss Cushing, then eit-
her the murderer sent the ears to Miss Cushing to inform her that the murder was 
done, or to cause her pain.>
9. If the murderer sent the ears to Miss Cushing to inform her that the murder was 
done, then Miss Cushing knows who the murderer is.
10. If Miss Cushing knows who the murderer is, then she would not have called the 
police about receiving the box of ears.
   [c. Miss Cushing called the police about receiving the box of ears.]
11. If Miss Cushing knows who the murderer is and wishes to shield the murderer’s 
identity, then she would have buried the ears.
   [d. Miss Cushing did not bury the ears.]
   [e. The murderer did not send the ears to Miss Cushing to cause her pain.]
   [f. If it is not the case that if the murderer sent the ears to Miss Cushing, then the 
murderer has a strong reason for sending the ears to Miss Cushing, then the murderer 
may have sent the ears to Miss Cushing by mistake.]
—————————
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   [h. The two persons to whom the ears belong are dead (murdered).]
12. The murder of the two persons to whom the ears belong occurred before Thurs-
day.
   [i. The murderer sent the ears to Miss Cushing.]
   [j. The murderer has a strong reason for sending the ears to Miss Cushing.]
   [k. Either the murderer sent the ears to Miss Cushing to inform her that the murder 
was done, or to cause her pain.]
13. Miss Cushing does not know who the murderer is.
   [l. Miss Cushing does not wish to shield the murderer’s identity.]
   [m. The murderer did not send the ears to Miss Cushing to inform her that the mur-
der was done.]
   [n. The murderer sent the ears to Miss Cushing to cause her pain.]
   [o. It is not the case that the murderer sent the ears to Miss Cushing either to inform 
her that the murder was done, or to cause her pain.]
   [p. It is not the case that if the murderer sent the ears to Miss Cushing, then the mur-
derer has a strong reason for sending the ears to Miss Cushing.]
   [q. The murderer may have sent the ears to Miss Cushing by mistake.]
If we limit ourselves to the pictorial devices of the standard diagram-
ming method, then the diagram of Holmes’ reasoning looks like this:358  Dale JACQUETTE 
This is an informative representation. It tells us quite a bit about the 
external inferential structure of the argument in Holmes’ not-so-elemen-
tary-my-dear-Watson  reasoning.  However,  the  standard  diagram  also 
leaves many aspects of Holmes’ thinking concealed. The exact nature of 
the disjunctive, conditional, and reductio inferences, essential to Holmes’ 
logic, in particular, are obscured. The next step in understanding the ar-
gument might therefore be to sketch a diagram of the inference accord-
ing to the enhanced diagramming method, working from the very same 
informal reconstruction. 
I am not going to give away the ending — not of how Conan Doyle’s 
sleuth solves the mystery of the salted ears, nor of how the enhanced di-
agram is to be completed. We can see clearly from the reconstruction of 
this portion of the story that Holmes has available for further reflection 
in trying to catch the murderer the information that the ears of the vic-
tims probably belong to a man and a woman, that the murder occurred 
before Thursday, that the murderer is probably unknown to Miss Cush-
ing, and that the murderer probably sent Miss Cushing the ears by mis-
take (this subconclusion in fact turns out to be crucial to Holmes’ even-
tual discovery of the criminal). There is an interesting logical twist to the 
puzzle, which, as Holmes says, needs to be untangled10. 
16. CONCLUSION: EXPLOITING GRAPHIC TECHNIQUES
It is only by enhancing the standard informal logic diagramming meth-
od by conventions equivalent to those proposed here that diagramming 
can represent the internal logical relationships that ensure the deduction 
of  an  argument’s  conclusions  from  it  assumptions.  The  failure  of  the 
standard  diagramming  method  to  represent  this  internal  structure  ex-
plains the lack of interest formal logicians typically assume toward argu-
10  An enhanced diagram of Holmes’ argument is prepared from the standard diagram 
by replacing additive inference icons with appropriate T-pattern, circle, delta, diamond, or 
butterfly diagramming modules. The difficulty lies in thinking through the original argu-
ment statement to determine where particular kinds of modules are needed, and in arrang-
ing and linking-up the component subdiagrams correctly and discernibly in two dimen-
sions. The problem is alleviated somewhat by the fact that connecting inference arrows can 
be drawn from remote distances on the diagram surface to the proposition numbers to 
which they attach. In this sense, the method is less restricted than Venn and Euler diagram-
ming techniques in depicting predicative inference relations among the extensions of four 
or five predicates. With enough paper and patience, it is always possible to prepare a more 
informative enhanced informal logic diagram from any preliminary standard diagram or 
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ment (as opposed to semantic tableaux or Smullyan truth-tree) diagram-
ming11. 
The limitations of standard diagramming methods are not inherent. 
The standard diagramming method can be supplemented with addition-
al conventions by which the logical structures of propositions that enter 
into arguments as assumptions and conclusions can further be pictorial-
ly  represented  within  a  recognizably  standard  framework,  while  going 
beyond its limited palette of diagramming devices. The enhanced argu-
ment diagramming method which has been proposed holds out the pros-
pect of bridging informal and formal logic with a graphic resource that 
will be more useful to informal logicians, and that can be taken more se-
riously by formal logicians12.
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